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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL UPDATES
united StateS
U.s. Congress overturns U.s. 
supreme Court’s Interpretation of 
“Disability”
The American Disabilities Act Amend-
ments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) takes effect 
on January 1, 2009. The Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibits 
employers, among others, from discrimi-
nating against individuals with disabilities, 
thus preventing their exclusion from soci-
ety. Under the ADA, “disability” is a physi-
cal or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities. 
Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court 
(the Court) strictly interpreted the meaning 
of “disability,” prohibiting many individu-
als from receiving the benefits the ADA 
provides. The ADAAA amends the ADA 
and directly overturns the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s strict interpretation.
Prior to the ADAAA, the Court’s two 
most significant cases regarding the ADA 
were Sutton v. United Airlines and Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams, which greatly limited the defi-
nition of disability. The Court held that 
major life activities only included those 
activities of central importance to daily life 
such as working. The use of corrective or 
mitigating measures affected the Court’s 
evaluation of whether an individual had a 
substantial limitation of a major life activ-
ity. For example, the Court did not con-
sider a person who was severely myopic 
disabled, such as in Sutton v. United Air-
lines, because that person could correct the 
visual impairment. The Court further nar-
rowed the definition of disability, requir-
ing that the individual be significantly 
restricted from performing either a class of 
jobs or a broad range of jobs as compared 
to the average person with comparable 
training, skills, and abilities. 
The ADAAA explicitly rejects the 
Court’s demanding standards to restore the 
original protection intended by Congress. 
The ADAAA clarifies the definition of 
disability, redefining “major life activity” 
and revising other aspects of the law. The 
ADAAA specifies that, “in general . . . 
major life activities include, but are not 
limited to, caring for oneself, perform-
ing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, 
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bend-
ing, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, 
concentrating, thinking, communicating, 
and working.” Under the ADAAA, the 
qualifying impairment does not need to 
limit more than one major life activity 
and can be episodic or in remission. The 
ADAAA eliminates the Court’s interpre-
tation that an individual’s disability must 
restrict them from either a class of jobs or 
a broad range of jobs. The ADAAA also 
overrides the Court by prohibiting lower 
courts from considering mitigating or cor-
rective measures in their analysis. 
Although some worry that the ADAAA 
might increase lawsuits by increasing the 
quantity of individuals qualifying as dis-
abled, the clarified definitions will likely 
lead to a decrease in litigation. The ADAAA 
provides a clear, national mandate to fol-
low which will prevent misinterpretations 
by employers that previously made com-
pliance difficult. The ADAAA will protect 
individuals with conditions not previously 
covered, such as carpal tunnel, depression, 
and learning disabilities. Representatives 
Steny Hoyer and James Sensenbrenner, 
two of the ADAAA’s sponsors, said in a 
joint statement, “With the passage of the 
ADA Amendments Act . . . today, we 
ensure that the ADA’s promise for people 
with disabilities will be finally fulfilled. 
Our expectation is that this law will afford 
people with disabilities the freedom to 
participate in our community, free from 
discrimination and its segregating effects 
that we sought to achieve with the original 
ADA.” 
states Passing Conflicting 
Immigration Laws
The U.S. federal government has failed 
to significantly reform federal immigra-
tion laws to address the nation’s problem 
with illegal immigration. State govern-
ments argue that the lack of national lead-
ership has left them no other choice but 
to begin passing their own laws. Legisla-
tures in 46 states have adopted over 244 
immigration-related measures in the last 
year. While some states are passing stricter 
laws enforcing current federal laws, others 
are passing more lenient laws that protect 
illegal immigrants’ rights. 
Like many states looking to curb ille-
gal immigration, Tennessee’s legislature 
revoked laws granting illegal immigrants 
driving certificates and has allowed law 
enforcement officers to act as state immi-
gration police. Tennessee and other states, 
such as Colorado, have passed laws that 
suspend or revoke business licenses of 
employers who knowingly hire illegal 
immigrants. One of the toughest, the Okla-
homa Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act 
of 2007, makes it a felony to transport or 
shelter illegal immigrants. It denies illegal 
immigrants access to driver’s licenses and 
public benefits such as rental assistance 
and fuel subsidies. It also forces govern-
ment contractors to check new employees 
against a federal system called E-Verify to 
make sure they are legally eligible to work, 
with the penalty of losing their contracts 
for noncompliance. Currently, nine states 
require employers and state agencies to use 
the E-Verify system. State Representative 
Randy Terrill, who authored the Oklahoma 
bill, argues that the bill saves taxpayers’ 
money by not subsidizing services for ille-
gal immigrants.
Not only has Oklahoma’s bill negatively 
affected the state economy, but it also rep-
resents a far-reaching attempt to expand 
the immigration enforcement power of 
states. Businesses, especially those in the 
agriculture industry, face worker shortages 
because they cannot employ anyone of 
unknown legal status. The resulting delays 
in production particularly affect consumers 
in the agriculture and construction indus-
tries. Construction industry leaders argue 
that raised wages in Oklahoma, a state with 
low unemployment, would lead to a net 
loss of jobs as some businesses close due to 
competition with other states allowing less 
stringent hiring practices. As businesses 
struggle to adjust to the new law, legal 
immigrants and citizens have also lost jobs. 
Many illegal immigrants and their family 
members who are legal immigrants or U.S. 
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citizens are leaving Oklahoma in order to 
find a safer haven in nearby states such as 
Missouri and Arkansas. 
Missouri and Arkansas are not the 
only states with more lenient immigration 
laws. To prevent employers from taking 
national origin into account in their hir-
ing decisions, Illinois recently attempted 
to pass a law prohibiting businesses from 
using E-Verify to check the legal status 
of employees. Advocates of the Illinois 
law argue that the E-Verify system is 
flawed and inaccurate; legal immigrants 
and citizens can lose their jobs if the 
system discovers any Social Security inac-
curacies. Those who are here legally could 
also be questioned or investigated by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
because of a discrepancy. New York, in 
contrast to Oklahoma, wants to offer driv-
er’s licenses to illegal immigrants and has 
already extended limited medical coverage 
to those battling cancer. A former New 
York governor stated, “We’re left dealing 
with the reality of up to 1 million [illegal] 
immigrants in New York. . . . I would 
prefer to have [them] carrying a legitimate 
form of identification, a driver’s license 
that allows them to get insurance, allows 
our law enforcement to track their driving 
records and brings these drivers out of the 
shadows.” Some cities, such as New York 
City and Washington, DC, even consider 
themselves to be “sanctuary cities” by 
adopting a “don’t ask–don’t tell” policy; 
the cities do not require city employees, 
such as police officers, to report poten-
tial illegal immigrants. The Alaska state 
legislature passed a resolution prohibiting 
state agencies from using their resources to 
enforce federal immigration laws. 
Some states, like Florida and Alabama, 
are working with the federal government 
through cooperative agreements instead 
of attempting to pass legislation enforcing 
federal laws. The agreements place local 
law enforcement officers under the direc-
tion of the DHS to exercise immigration 
enforcement authority. The agreements 
allow cooperation between the federal gov-
ernment and the states while leaving the 
control over the enforcement with the fed-
eral government. 
The conflicting state laws may pose a 
problem for the federal government when 
seeking reform. Some fear that federal 
standards will never be possible; the longer 
states must regulate immigration issues on 
their own — some being entirely contra-
dictory — the harder it will be to create 
consensus in favor of uniform rules. Others 
argue that the increase in state legislation 
provides an opportunity for the federal 
government to observe and study what 
does and does not work. The problem with 
this “laboratory” approach is that it takes 
time; as more time passes and states con-
tinue to take conflicting approaches, creat-
ing uniform federal legislation becomes 
more difficult. Additionally, legal battles 
are already taking place between the fed-
eral government and states whose laws 
conflict with the intent of the federal laws. 
For instance, the DHS sued the state of 
Illinois for its ban on the use of the E-Ver-
ify database, which Illinois State officials 
called flawed and unreliable. 
The continuing debate over the enforce-
ment of immigration laws and required 
reforms is controversial and presents sig-
nificant challenges. The new administra-
tion faces divided and conflicting policies 
that are already in place. New attempts to 
create uniform federal laws must analyze 
and balance the impact those laws will 
have on individual communities.
latin america
Mexico: Women Face  
Continuing Violence Despite 
Passage of 2007 Law
The 2006 National Survey of Domestic 
Relations (Encuesta Nacional sobre la 
Dinámica de las Relaciones en los Hog-
ares 2006 — ENDIREH), conducted by 
the United Nations Development Fund for 
Women (UNIFEM), in conjunction with 
the National Institute for Woman (Instituto 
Nacional de las Mujeres — INMUJERES) 
and the National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica y Geografía — INEGI), revealed that 
67% of women in Mexico have experi-
enced some form of violence. The study 
concludes that nearly one in four Mexican 
women have been physically or sexually 
abused by a present or past partner. The 
study seeks to raise awareness of violence 
against women by providing statistical data 
on both the national and state levels.
Pandemic violence against women in 
Mexico persists despite passage of the 
2007 General Law on Women’s Access 
to a Life Free of Violence (Ley General 
de Acceso de las Mujeres a un Vida Libre 
de Violencia). The law requires “federal 
and local authorities to prevent, punish 
and eradicate violence against women.” 
The law also creates several defined cat-
egories of violence, including domestic, 
workplace, institutional, and gender-based 
violence. Federal, state, and municipal 
governments are also charged with specific 
responsibilities under the law. 
Continued violence, however, has led 
many to conclude that Mexican authorities 
do not take the issue seriously. Amnesty 
International identified several obstacles 
that women face when trying to report 
cases of domestic violence in a series of 
reports and articles in August 2008. Their 
reports conclude that the federal and state 
governments have failed in the implemen-
tation and funding of the law. Women face 
officials refusing to accept complaints, 
deficient investigations, and poor enforce-
ment of protective measures, an Amnesty 
International report says. In some cases, 
officials have even asked women to deliver 
summons to their aggressors.
Several states have passed additional 
legislation to the 2006 General Law. In 
some instances, however, the additional 
state legislation has actually deterred 
women from reporting cases of violence. 
The Chiapas Law on Women’s Access to 
a Life Free of Violence, for instance, omits 
many of the violence-defining  sections 
and regulation responsibilities found in the 
general national law, and lacks a budget. 
These characteristics led attorney Mar-
tha Figueroa Mier of Grupo Mujeres de 
San Cristóbal, to conclude that with this 
“new law, we have law, but we have no 
protection.”
Such was the case of “Martha,” first 
reported by Amnesty International in May 
2008. Martha, a Mexico City resident, 
sought police assistance three times within 
a year, reporting that her husband was 
punching her in the stomach so fiercely 
that she could barely breathe after each 
beating. The police told her that they could 
do nothing unless she returned with cuts 
and bruises. Martha explained that her 
husband raped her on a weekly basis. The 
police, however, never arrested Martha’s 
husband, nor did they even bring him in 
for questioning. Cases such as Martha’s 
demonstrate that even after the adoption 
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of the 2007 law, curbing violence against 
women is still not a priority in Mexico. The 
National Institute for Women in Mexico 
reports that the rate of violence against 
women in Mexico is twice the worldwide 
average. “It’s considered natural,” laments 
the Institute’s executive secretary. While 
the passing of the anti-violence law was an 
important first step in providing a measure 
of protection to women, they will con-
tinue to face the same obstacles as before 
until the Mexican government steps in 
to enforce it and make women’s safety a 
priority.
Colombia Misuses Red Cross 
Emblem During Betancourt Rescue
The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), in an August 6, 2008 state-
ment, condemned the misuse of its emblem 
by Colombian forces during the 2 July 
2008 rescue mission that liberated fifteen 
captives from the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), including 
former Colombian senator and one-time 
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. 
Her release sparked an international cel-
ebration. Betancourt, held captive since 
2002, described her rescue as “a miracle,” 
and “a moment of pride for Colombia.” 
Colombian forces posed as aid work-
ers transporting the captives by helicopter 
from one FARC camp to another. The res-
cue mission was the result of years worth 
of intelligence gathering and has been 
considered a daring success. The Colom-
bian government, however, has since faced 
stiff criticism after allegations surfaced 
that a member of the rescue team misused 
the Red Cross emblem during the rescue 
mission.
The original Geneva Convention, 
adopted on 22 August 1864, established 
the Red Cross symbol, and articles 37, 38, 
39 and 85 of Additional Protocol govern 
the symbol’s use. The articles establish 
that “feigning of protected status by the 
use of . . . emblems” of neutral parties is 
a violation of international humanitarian 
law. The Commentary on Article 38 of 
the Geneva Convention establishes that 
neutral emblems such as the Red Cross 
are intended “to signify one thing only — 
something which is, however, of immense 
importance: respect for the individual who 
suffers and is defenseless, who must be 
aided, whether friend or enemy, without 
distinction of nationality, race, religion, 
class or opinion.” 
The Colombian government initially 
denied any use of the Red Cross emblem, 
but later said that rescuers unintentionally 
used the Red Cross symbol. Colombian 
President Álvaro Uribe described the sym-
bol’s use as an error. “This officer, upon 
confessing his mistake to his superiors, 
said when the [rescue] helicopter was 
about to land . . . he saw so many guerrillas 
that he went into a state of angst,” Uribe 
explained.
Photos taken before the rescue mis-
sion and video taken during the rescue, 
however, show one man of the rescue 
team donning the Red Cross bib moments 
before the mission began. The bib in the 
photos clearly shows the Red Cross sym-
bol. The videos show the same man stand-
ing next to FARC generals throughout the 
rescue mission. Regardless of whether the 
emblem’s use was unintentional, maintain-
ing the neutrality of the emblem is vital 
to the ICRC’s missions around the world. 
Violations endanger the ICRC’s ability 
to safely serve populations in situations 
of violence and armed conflict. The Red 
Cross emblem may only be deployed to 
protect medical units and establishments. 
These regulations apply both in situations 
of external and internal conflict. Using 
the emblem in a deceitful way constitutes 
perfidious use and is a war crime. Main-
taining the emblem’s neutrality is of para-
mount concern in protecting the safety of 
humanitarian aid workers across the globe 
and ensuring they will be able to continue 
their work.
Venezuela Expels Human  
Rights Watch Activists After 
Critical Report 
On September 18, 2008, Venezuela 
expelled Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
Americas Director José Miguel Vivanco 
and Deputy Director Daniel Wilkinson. 
Earlier that day, Vivanco and Wilkin-
son presented their report “A Decade 
Under Chavez: Political Intolerance and 
Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human 
Rights in Venezuela.” The HRW report 
concluded that the expanded human rights 
guarantees under the 1999 Constitution 
have “been largely squandered.” Vivanco 
also stated that that President Hugo Chávez 
had “weakened democratic institutions 
and human rights guarantees” during his 
decade in power. 
Vivanco and Wilkinson’s expulsion has 
led to international criticism of the Ven-
ezuelan government. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
issued a statement that “this measure 
affects the right to freedom of expression 
of the representatives of that organization 
and constitutes an act of intolerance against 
criticism which is an essential component 
of democracy.” The International Com-
mission of Jurists also stressed that “such a 
move is an attack on freedom of expression 
and legitimate defense of human rights.”
In a televised statement, the Vene-
zuelan Foreign Ministry said that Vivanco, 
a Chilean national, “illegally interfered in 
the country’s internal affairs,” and that the 
expulsion “is a clear message to whoever 
intends to come here and plot from within.” 
In response, the Chilean Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs called the expulsion a dis-
proportionate reaction. 
The expulsion of the HRW directors is 
yet another instance of the Chávez govern-
ment curtailing freedom of expression. In 
May 2007, the Venezuelan government 
denied a broadcasting license renewal for 
the nation’s oldest private television chan-
nel, Radio Caracas Televisión. The station 
was consistently critical of the Chávez 
administration. The United States govern-
ment, the European Union, the IACHR, 
the Chilean Senate, the EU Parliament, 
and the Inter-American Press Association 
criticized the decision.
Under Chávez, the Venezuelan govern-
ment increased both the scope of speech 
and broadcasting offenses and the penal-
ties for committing these offenses. Human 
rights watchdogs argue that these tough-
ened laws have been used to contravene 
international norms of freedom of expres-
sion and have stacked the deck against 
critical opposition.
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aFrica
Complaints Against Hissène Habré 
Filed with senegalese Prosecutor
In July 2008, the Senegalese Parlia-
ment took final steps in removing legal 
barriers to prosecute former Chadian dicta-
tor Hissène Habré for torture and crimes 
against humanity. Under pressure from the 
European Union (EU), the African Union 
(AU), and international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), Senegal took the 
first step in February 2007 and passed 
legislation allowing it to prosecute cases 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and torture, even when committed 
outside of the country. The constitutional 
amendment passed in July 2008 allows 
laws such as this one to be applied retroac-
tively, as is necessary for the legislation to 
apply to crimes allegedly committed dur-
ing Habré’s eight-year rule (1982–1990).
With a legal pathway finally cleared 
for prosecution, fourteen victims of abuse 
under Habré’s regime, including two Sen-
egalese merchants, filed complaints with 
a Senegalese prosecutor on September 
16, 2008. The complaints detail politi-
cal arrests, detention, torture, and other 
abuses suffered at the hands of Habré’s 
political police, the DDS (Direction de la 
Documentation et de la Sécurité). “The 
evidence shows that Habré was not a dis-
tant ruler who knew nothing about these 
crimes,” says Reed Brody, a lawyer at 
Human Rights Watch. “Habré directed and 
controlled the police force which tortured 
those who opposed him or those who sim-
ply belonged to the wrong ethnic group.” 
After being deposed in a 1990 military 
coup, Habré fled to Senegal in 1991. Vic-
tims of torture under his rule have been 
pressing for his prosecution ever since, 
through NGOs such as the Chadian Associ-
ation of Victims of Political Repression and 
Crime. In 2000, Senegal indicted Habré, 
but the process stalled due to political and 
legal concerns, particularly that Senegal’s 
laws at the time did not allow prosecution 
for crimes committed outside the country. 
Disappointed, victims and their advocates 
turned to Belgian courts, which after a 
four-year investigation, in September 2005 
charged Habré with crimes against human-
ity, war crimes, and torture. Senegalese 
authorities arrested Habré but refused Bel-
gium’s extradition request. 
International pressure has played an 
important part in moving Senegal forward. 
In May 2005, the United Nations Com-
mittee Against Torture ruled that Senegal 
was in violation of its treaty obligations 
under the Convention Against Torture, to 
which it is a party, since it failed to either 
prosecute or extradite Habré. Senegal then 
appealed to the AU, requesting advice 
on how to proceed. In July 2006, the AU 
called on Senegal to prosecute Habré “in 
the name of Africa.” 
The Senegalese government, including 
President Abdoulaye Wade and the Justice 
Minister Madické Niang, has appeared 
supportive of prosecution despite a highly 
politicized environment. In August 2008, 
Chadian courts sentenced Habré and 11 
others to death in absentia for participating 
in or supporting the February 2008 coup 
attempt against Chadian president Idriss 
Deby Itno. Upon receiving this news, 
Minister Niang publicly expressed surprise 
about the Chadian conviction: “If Hissène 
Habré was judged for the same deeds 
for which he is prosecuted in Senegal 
. . . he could no longer appear before any 
court in the world.” Because Habré was 
not charged for acts committed in Chad 
between 1982 and 1990, the principle of 
double jeopardy does not apply. While 
the principle of double jeopardy is not 
uniformly applied worldwide, one fear is 
that if a Chadian prosecutor were to charge 
Habré for crimes committed between 1982 
and 1990, Senegal might refuse to pros-
ecute him altogether. 
Among its own citizens, the Senegalese 
government has faced criticism for “modi-
fying its national constitution to satisfy the 
desire for vengeance of the Europeans and 
Libyans against Habré, who had chased 
them from his country,” and for “selling 
an old African head of state to white slave 
drivers for 18 million francs,” a reference 
to the financing promised by the EU to 
assist with the costs of a future trial. Along 
with such editorials, Senegalese news-
papers have in recent weeks also published 
the statements of Habré’s legal defense 
team, which claims that the victims’ com-
plaints are aimed at the DDS rather than 
Habré, and that, even after the constitu-
tional amendments, it will be “impossible 
for Senegalese justice to start new prosecu-
tion against their client.”
African Union Finalizes Plan for 
Merger of African Courts
At the 11th Summit of the African 
Union (AU) in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt in 
early July 2008, the AU adopted the draft 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR), 
drafted in April 2008 by justice ministers 
of the AU member states. The statute will 
enter into force 30 days after ratification 
by 15 member states. The ACJHR will be 
the main judicial organ of the AU and will 
merge and replace both the African Court 
of Justice (ACJ) and the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). 
According to the draft protocol, the new 
ACJHR will be composed of 16 judges 
split evenly between two chambers: a Gen-
eral Affairs Section and a Human Rights 
Section. The Human Rights Section, like 
the ACHPR, will have jurisdiction to hear 
cases alleging violations of rights granted 
under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, the Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child, Protocol on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, or any other 
human rights instrument ratified by the 
State in question. 
In months leading up to the AU Sum-
mit and since adopting the Protocol, NGOs 
have criticized a key element of the pro-
posed structure: the refusal by the drafting 
justice ministers to grant individuals the 
right to directly access the new court. In 
a June 2008 editorial, Chidi Odinkalu of 
the Open Society Institute’s Justice Initia-
tive and Nobuntu Mbelle of the Coalition 
for an Effective African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (the Coalition) wrote: 
“That Africa needs this court is not in 
doubt. In many states, national laws are 
outdated, non-existent or inadequate; courts 
are ineffective or inaccessible; and public 
prosecutions have become too politicized 
or weakened by self-indulgent politicians. . 
. .” However, the two authors continue, the 
new, merged court “has design flaws simi-
lar to those that have made it impossible for 
the [ACHPR], established a decade ago, to 
receive any case to date. . . . By denying 
individual victims access to the new court, 
governments will close an avenue through 
which atrocities might be addressed, effec-
tively rendering the court still-born.”
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Another serious design flaw, accord-
ing to ACHPR Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz, 
is the impossibly broad mission of the 
merged court. Speaking at the Advocacy 
Before Human Rights Bodies: A Cross 
Regional Agenda conference at American 
University Washington College of Law in 
October 2008, he expressed concern that 
the ACJHR may not be “fully equipped” 
to deal with a jurisdiction roughly cor-
responding to that which Europe divides 
between four bodies: the European Court 
of Human Rights, the European Court of 
Justice, the International Court of Justice, 
and the UN Administrative Tribunal.
Since the ACJHR protocol’s adoption, 
the Coalition and regional NGOs have 
lobbied African nations to ratify it, while 
at the same time continuing to criticize 
the design flaws. For example, the Nige-
rian Bar Association, a Coalition member, 
published a position statement urging the 
Nigerian government to adopt the single 
legal instrument establishing the ACJHR 
and simultaneously supporting ongoing 
negotiations “to assure the right of indi-
vidual access to the proposed court.”
Fears that the ACJHR will prove inef-
fective as a forum for protecting human 
rights in Africa arise from the disappoint-
ing progress of its predecessors. The devel-
opment of a pan-African human rights 
court has moved at a snail’s pace since it 
was first proposed in 1961. In 1981, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights was established, followed by the 
establishment of the African Commission 
in 1987. Since the Commission lacked 
power to render or enforce decisions on 
complaints brought before it, the ACPHR 
was conceived in 1998. 
Not until late 2003, however, did the 
requisite number of members ratify the 
protocol. The court’s protocol came into 
force in 2004; judges were not appointed 
until 2005; and to date, only 24 of the 
53 AU member states have ratified the 
ACPHR, which has yet to hear a case. As 
of early 2008, just 15 AU members had 
ratified the protocol of the ACJ, created 
in 2003. 
Problems Continue in Camps for 
those Displaced by south Africa’s 
Xenophobic Violence
Months have passed without resolu-
tion to the wave of xenophobic violence 
killing 60, injuring hundreds, and displac-
ing thousands of foreigners — most from 
elsewhere in Africa — residing in South 
Africa. The South African government 
established shelters for victims and those 
targeted in the attacks. Originally, the shel-
ters or camps established for victims were 
given a two-month timeframe, and govern-
ment officials readily admitted that this 
was not a long-term solution. “We could 
have a dilemma,” said Thabo Masebe, a 
spokesman for the Gauteng local govern-
ment. “We cannot force people to go back 
to their home countries [or reintegrate] and 
we cannot establish permanent shelters.”
Although most local governments 
planned to close camps in mid to late 
August, many camps have remained open. 
Civil society organizations called for the 
camps to remain open until the government 
publishes a detailed reintegration plan. 
In Gauteng Province, groups obtained an 
interim order from the Constitutional Court 
to keep camps open until at least Sep-
tember 30. On October 1, the provincial 
government shut down the Glenada Camp 
and began shutting down two remaining 
camps. 
In Gauteng, many are electing to return 
to their home countries rather than reinte-
grate. The opposite is true in Western Cape 
Province, where approximately 90 percent 
opted for reintegration, despite reported 
violence towards some returning to their 
South African communities.
middle eaSt and north aFrica
saudi Arabia: Police and  
Courts Discriminate Against 
Religious Minority
In a recent report, Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) states that government officials in 
Saudi Arabia have subjected members of a 
Shi’a sect, the Ismailis, to secret detentions, 
torture, and unfair trials since 2000. As a 
signatory to the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), Saudi Arabia is 
bound to ensure that its law enforcement 
and judicial system do not discriminate 
on the basis of ethnic origin. Saudi Arabia 
ratified the ICERD in 1997 but has failed 
to adhere to it. Over 400,000 Ismailis 
live in the southern province of Najran, 
where they have experienced increased 
ill-treatment from the current governor’s 
administration. 
The HRW report focuses on the con-
sequences of the April 2000 arrest of 
Ismaili cleric Muhammad al-Khayyat for 
“sorcery.” In conjunction with the arrest, 
the police confiscated religious books and 
other belongings from students inside an 
Ismaili mosque. Witnesses heard shots 
fired and at least one person was injured, 
though sources are unclear on whether the 
injured was a student or an officer. The 
event triggered a demonstration outside 
the residence of Governor Prince Mish’al. 
The local police arrived and exchanged 
fire with the protestors, killing at least one 
person from each side. After the demon-
stration ended, the police arrested between 
400 and 500 people, some of whom had 
not even participated in the protest. The 
report also admonishes the Saudi Arabian 
government for preaching religious toler-
ance worldwide while systematically dis-
criminating against its own citizens.
Many of the detainees arrested after 
the demonstration experienced inhumane 
conditions in prison. All of the detainees 
interviewed by HRW had been tortured. 
Prisoners also faced harsh interrogations, 
beatings, electric shock treatments, and 
sleep deprivation. Guards suspended one 
man from a cable for hours while they beat 
him. As a result of being tortured, detain-
ees falsely confessed to committing acts 
of violence during the demonstration. The 
Saudi Arabian courts also participated in 
discriminatory trials and judgments against 
prisoners. Detainees faced secret trials, 
some of which were unknown even to 
the prisoner on trial. Some received their 
sentences when they appeared at court, 
after being forced to sign false confes-
sions. King Abdullah pardoned many of 
those detained during an official visit to the 
region, but seven detainees are currently 
still in prison.
In April 2008, Ismaili leader, Shaikh 
Ahmad bin Turki Al Sa’b, led a delega-
tion to present a petition to King Abdullah, 
detailing the condition of Ismailis in Najran 
and requesting the dismissal of Prince 
Mish’al. One month later, Al Sa’b was 
arrested, and six months later, he remains 
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detained without charge. In response to the 
incidents of April 2000, HRW urges the 
Saudi government to open an investigation 
into the treatment of detainees arrested in 
the aftermath. HRW also urges the Saudi 
government to adhere to the standards of 
ICERD and to establish a national human 
rights monitoring body to investigate the 
abuses suffered by the Ismailis, as well as 
the legal consequences of the April 2000 
demonstration. In November 2008, King 
Abdullah removed Prince Mish’al from his 
post as governor of Najran. This occurred 
after continued protests by Ismailis about 
the treatment of detainees arrested in April 
2000 and the release of HRW’s report 
condemning Prince Mish’al’s abuse of the 
Ismailis. Saudi officials, however, continue 
to mistreat Ismailis.
Iran’s Execution Rate tripled in 
three Years
Iran’s execution rate has more than 
tripled under the administration of Presi-
dent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran has the 
second highest execution rate in the world, 
surpassed only by China. In recent years, 
as Iran’s execution rate has increased, the 
international community has heavily criti-
cized the Iranian government for its lack of 
transparency in death penalty proceedings 
and its continued execution of juvenile 
offenders. In particular, both the European 
Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) 
have expressed concern over Iran’s execu-
tion of juvenile offenders. 
In the three years since Ahmadinejad 
became the president of Iran, executions 
have drastically increased. In 2005, when 
Ahmadinejad took office, Iran executed 86 
people. In 2007, that number had increased 
to 317. As of September 2008, the UN 
estimated that the Iranian government had 
already executed 220 people. Iran is also 
one of only a few countries that execute 
juvenile offenders, a practice that accounts 
for two-thirds of all juvenile executions 
worldwide in the past three years. Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) estimates that the 
Iranian government has executed at least 
six juvenile offenders so far this year with 
another 120 on death row. In August, Beh-
nam Zare and Seyyed Reza were executed 
for murders they committed when they 
were 16 and 15 years old, respectively.
Iran’s law permitting the execution of 
juvenile offenders is in direct violation of 
UN treaties that the Iranian government 
has ratified. Signatories to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights have promised not to execute any 
offenders under the age of 18. Iran, how-
ever, identifies adulthood as beginning at 
puberty, and has set the age as 15 for boys 
and nine for girls. 
Iran’s death penalty laws provide the 
courts with a wide-reaching authority over 
how executions are carried out. Iran’s 
legal system authorizes the death penalty 
for a number of crimes, including insult-
ing the Prophet, murder, and social crimes 
like adultery. With murder cases, the law 
allows for the practice of qisas-e-nafs, or 
retribution. Victims’ family members can 
pardon the criminal, ask for retribution, 
or accept compensation in place of retri-
bution. In recent years, however, Iran’s 
judicial system has shown a disregard for 
the requirements of the law. Iran’s lack of 
transparency does not provide sufficient 
notice about imminent executions. Ira-
nian law requires the family and lawyers 
of the criminal to be notified at least 48 
hours before the execution. In Behnam 
Zare’s case, however, neither his family 
nor his lawyer was notified until after his 
execution. 
Iran’s death penalty system provides 
the government with unchecked power 
over the lives of those on death row. With 
hundreds of people on death row, including 
130 children, Iran’s human rights crisis has 
escalated drastically under the administra-
tion of President Ahmadinejad. 
torture and Unfair trials for 
Demonstrators in Egypt
Forty-nine people in Egypt are await-
ing the continuation of their trials after 
authorities arrested them for participating 
in a series of protests on April 6, 2008, 
in the city of Malhalla. The detainees are 
being tried by the Egyptian government 
in front of an emergency court and have 
faced severe ill-treatment at the hands of 
prison guards during their imprisonment. 
In September 2008, Amnesty International 
released a statement urging the Egyptian 
government to transfer the cases to an 
ordinary court and to open an investiga-
tion into the nature of the arrests. Egypt 
has renewed its state of emergency almost 
continuously since 1981 after the assas-
sination of President Anwar Sadat. Under 
emergency law, the Egyptian government 
can detain people without charges and can 
use emergency courts. Emergency courts 
do not follow legal procedures as carefully 
as ordinary courts do, and those on trial 
often receive sentences without the ability 
to adequately defend themselves. 
More than 150,000 workers across 
Egypt have been involved in strikes, sit-
ins, and other demonstrations in an attempt 
to increase the minimum wage. The Egyp-
tian government banned strikes on April 5, 
2008 to maintain order. A demonstration 
of textile-factory workers was scheduled 
by labor organizers to take place the next 
day, but was called off in response to 
the ban. Violent demonstrations occurred 
anyway, leading to large-scale clashes 
between security forces and demonstra-
tors. At least three people, including one 
school boy, died after being shot by law 
enforcement officials. Many more protes-
tors were wounded and over 250 people 
were later arrested, including the 49 people 
who are now awaiting the continuation of 
their  trials before the emergency court. In 
May, the state of emergency was set to 
expire. Despite formal denials from the 
Egyptian government that it was going to 
be renewed, Parliament approved a two 
year extension of emergency law in May.
The 49 detainees were subjected to 
harsh interrogation and torture while in 
prison. They were blindfolded by guards 
for nine days, beaten, faced electric shocks, 
and received threats to their family mem-
bers. Interrogators obtained forced con-
fessions from them that they had thrown 
stones at the police, though some of the 
detainees maintain that they were not even 
present at the demonstrations. Their law-
yers complained about their treatment, but 
no action was taken.
The trials in front of the emergency 
court will move forward with potentially 
tragic results. The courts have charged the 
49 accused individuals with illegal posses-
sion of firearms, violent resistance, assault 
on a police officer, assembly of more than 
five people with the aim of disturbing 
public order, ransacking and theft, and 
deliberate destruction of public and pri-
vate property. The detainees may receive 
up to 15 years in prison if convicted of 
these charges. Amnesty International has 
criticized the emergency courts for using 
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confessions obtained through torture and 
for their judicial proceedings being gener-
ally below standard. Unlike in a non-emer-
gency legal system, the emergency court 
rulings cannot be appealed and are final 
once ratified by President Hosni Mubarak, 
condemning detainees to their fate once 
they receive their sentence.
europe
European Parliament Condemns 
Italy’s treatment of the Roma
Italy’s move to fingerprint its entire 
Roma population has drawn harsh criti-
cism from the European Parliament (EP), 
which branded the effort a “direct act of 
racial discrimination.” Europe is currently 
home to over 10 million Roma, a com-
munity who currently constitute the largest 
ethnic minority in the European Union 
(EU). Roughly 150,000 Roma have moved 
to Italy, composing almost 10 percent of 
the population and living in some 700 
encampments. 
The Roma have encountered significant 
resistance from the Italian community. 
The 2007 murder of an Italian woman, in 
which the main suspect was a Romanian 
migrant of Roma descent, sparked a wave 
of vigilante justice against the community 
that included frequent fire bombings and 
mob attacks.
But the strongest criticisms are of the 
Italian government’s treatment of the Roma. 
The Italian government recently imple-
mented a plan to fingerprint the country’s 
entire Roma population, calling the move 
part of a broader crackdown on crime and 
a push for Roma children to attend school 
instead of begging. The fingerprinting ini-
tiative has already begun, and Italian For-
eign Minister Franco  Frattini defends the 
practice, claiming it “does not target ethnic 
groups and is not inspired by racism.”
In what some considered a surprising 
move, the European Commission (EC) 
approved the plan, suggesting that the 
fingerprinting measures are not discrimi-
natory or in breach of EU standards. An 
EC spokesperson stated that the plan only 
aimed to identify persons who cannot be 
identified in any other way, and would 
exclude data relating to ethnic origin or 
religion. Nonetheless, Italian newspapers 
recently published pictures of officials 
taking fingerprints and filing them accord-
ing to religion, ethnicity and level of 
education.
Many consider the fingerprinting to be 
a violation of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), a United Nations 
(UN) convention committing its members 
to the elimination of racial discrimination 
and the promotion of understanding among 
races. Italy signed the convention in March 
1968 and ratified it in January 1976, prom-
ising “[e]ffective remedies against acts of 
racial discrimination which violate indi-
vidual rights and fundamental freedoms.”
The fingerprinting initiative has sparked 
particularly loud protest from the EP, 
which held a Roma Summit in Brussels 
in September 2008. This Summit marked 
the first time that EU institutions, national 
governments, and European civil society 
organizations came together to discuss the 
ongoing discrimination of the Roma. In 
a vote of 336 to 220, members of the EP 
(MEPs) adopted a resolution calling on 
Italy to immediately cease its fingerprint-
ing practices. The resolution holds that the 
fingerprinting is an act of discrimination 
based on race and ethnic origin, and that 
the EP “condemn[s] utterly and without 
equivocation all forms of racism and dis-
crimination faced by the Roma and those 
seen as ‘gypsies.’” 
Although the resolution is not binding, 
lawmakers have urged the EC to inves-
tigate whether the fingerprinting policy 
violates European law. Commission presi-
dent José Manuel Barroso acknowledged 
increasing EC concern over the practices 
and issued an urgent appeal for united 
European action: “The problem which we 
are facing together  — as political lead-
ers and citizens, as members of majority 
societies and as Roma — is one of great 
urgency.” 
In response, Italy has watered down 
its practice, only requiring the fingerprint-
ing of those who cannot provide official 
documents. The international community 
remains concerned with the impact these 
potentially discriminatory tactics may have 
on the Roma community. A delegation 
of MEPs is scheduled to travel to Italy to 
observe the situation firsthand.
new Concerns over Rendition in 
U.K., other European Countries
In the midst of the United States’ war 
on terror, several European countries have 
been accused of turning a blind eye to 
America’s rendition tactics and allowing 
them to take place on European soil. In 
February 2007, members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) found evidence that 
the United States completed some 1,245 
covert flights in which detainees were 
moved to states where they could face 
torture. Despite persistent claims to the 
contrary, the MEPs’ official report stated 
that it was unlikely that European govern-
ments were unaware of rendition activities 
on their territory.
Recent investigations by the Council of 
Europe and the European Parliament (EP) 
have reignited controversy over Europe’s 
role in rendition. In 2007, the Council of 
Europe released a statement saying, “there 
was now enough evidence to state that 
secret detention facilities run by the CIA 
did exist in Europe from 2003 to 2005, in 
particular in Poland and Romania.” Dick 
Marty, a Swiss senator who led the Coun-
cil of Europe inquiry, says NATO allies 
entered into a secret agreement allowing 
the CIA to operate these jails. Marty also 
declared that Poland was a CIA black site 
where eight “high-value detainees” such as 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, alleged mas-
termind of the 9/11 attacks, were interro-
gated. Prosecutors in Poland did not launch 
an official investigation of these claims 
until August 2008.
Several human rights organizations are 
now calling for a similar investigation in 
the U.K., specifically focusing on concerns 
over the use of a U.S. base on the British-
owned island of Diego Garcia. Shortly after 
the 9/11 attacks, reports began to surface 
that U.S. planes seen in British airports 
and territories were being used to transport 
detainees to detention centers overseas. 
The British government repeatedly denied 
these claims, releasing statements that the 
U.S. had not requested permission for a 
rendition through U.K. territory or airspace 
at any time. 
These statements preceded a surpris-
ing announcement made by David Mili-
band, Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, in February 2008. 
Miliband admitted that on not one but two 
occasions, Diego Garcia was now known 
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to have been used for rendition flights. In 
an effort to pacify both local and interna-
tional concern, Miliband announced an 
ongoing collaborative effort between his 
office and multiple human rights organi-
zations to investigate any other flights of 
concern.
Groups such as Amnesty International 
are calling for further action, stating, 
“[n]ot a single measure has been taken 
to further prevent European involvement 
in U.S. renditions and secret detentions.” 
Despite calls for immediate investigation 
and prevention, other European countries 
with alleged participation such as Italy and 
Germany have yet to launch official inves-
tigations into their own involvement.
Russia-Georgia Conflict Raises 
Multiple Human Rights Issues
The recent conflict between Russia 
and Georgia has both sides alleging brutal 
human rights violations in the most seri-
ous confrontation between the two nations 
since their 1992 war. After several months 
of low-level conflict, Georgian troops 
launched an offensive attack against pro-
Russia separatists in the province of South 
Ossetia in August 2008. Russia responded 
by reinforcing their troops already sta-
tioned in South Ossetia, who then entered 
Georgia proper in a move many interpreted 
as a violation of the territorial integrity of 
the sovereign state. A brief but violent war 
erupted. 
Although French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy mediated a ceasefire that has 
seemingly quelled the countries’ fight-
ing, Russia and Georgia are now locked 
in a heated debate in which each side is 
accusing the other of breaching interna-
tional humanitarian law. The International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is currently investi-
gating these claims, and faces a challenge 
in determining fact amidst accusations 
of “indiscriminate violence, murder and 
genocide.” Researchers now suggest that 
both sides may have violated the laws of 
war in using violence that was dispropor-
tionate, discriminatory, or both. 
As these legal investigations get under-
way, human rights organizations are grow-
ing increasingly concerned as stories 
surface of brutal human rights violations on 
both sides. A guiding rule of international 
humanitarian law remains that dispropor-
tionate attacks are prohibited; if a country 
intends to attack a military target where 
there is likely to be excessive civilian 
damage relative to the expected gain, the 
country should not attack. It appears that 
neither Russia nor Georgia fully undertook 
their duty of civilian protection. Reports 
have emerged of Russian forces dropping 
bombs on a convoy of passengers fleeing 
Georgia’s Gori district, and of Georgian 
soldiers driving and firing tanks in resi-
dential areas. 
Despite the ICC’s ongoing investiga-
tion, both Russia and Georgia have sought 
other legal courses of action. Russian pros-
ecutors recently launched their own inves-
tigation into the deaths of 133 civilians 
they say were killed by Georgian forces. 
Although this number is significantly lower 
than initial estimates of up to 1,600 deaths, 
Russia still claims they have a potential 
case against Georgia for committing acts 
of genocide. 
In return, Georgia has filed a lawsuit 
with the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) alleging that Russia attempted to eth-
nically cleanse Georgians in the breakaway 
regions and killed at least 69 civilians. 
Georgia maintains that Russia breached 
the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, a conven-
tion that entered into force in 1969, which 
commits all parties to the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Both Russia 
and Georgia are parties to the Convention.
Although the fighting between Russia 
and Georgia has ceased for the time being, 
the international community recognizes 
that the situation remains volatile. As rep-
resentatives of the European Union arrive 
in Georgia to monitor the security situa-
tion, human rights organizations are call-
ing on the two nations to maintain peace. 
South and central aSia
India Becomes First Country  
to Convict suspect Based on Brain 
scan
In June 2008, a court in Pune, India, 
convicted a murder suspect partly based on 
evidence from a brain scan, sentencing her 
to life in prison. Using results from a Brain 
Electrical Oscillations Signature (BEOS) 
test as well as a polygraph test, Judge S.S. 
Phansalkar-Joshi asserted that the suspect 
had “experiential knowledge” that only 
the perpetrator could possess. The convict, 
Aditi Sharma, maintains her innocence. 
While consent to the procedure is required, 
the looming threat of abusive police inter-
rogations may leave the accused little 
choice but to accept.
The states of Maharashtra and Guja-
rat have established electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) labs for prosecutorial use and 
about seventy-five suspects have currently 
undergone the test. The June conviction, 
however, was the first time a suspect was 
convicted based upon the test.
The BEOS test consists of placing 
electrodes from an EEG on the scalp. The 
EEG processes electrical brain activity 
through computer software. Then, investi-
gators read aloud the actions and details of 
the crime and analyze the resulting brain 
waves for patterns of recognition. The 
developers of the test insist on its accu-
racy. The test has not been independently 
repeated, however, nor have its results been 
published in any renowned peer-reviewed 
scientific journals. 
Dr. Rosenfeld, a neuroscientist and 
psychologist at Northwestern University, 
asserted that such technologies are not 
credible without peer review and inde-
pendent replication. He further asserted, 
“The fact that an advanced and sophis-
ticated democratic society such as India 
would actually convict persons based on 
an unproven technology is even more 
incredible.” The technique is also suscep-
tible to criticisms that brain signals arising 
from actual memories versus illusory ones 
are largely indistinguishable. In a criti-
cal analysis of the brain scan procedure, 
Dr. Rosenfeld underscored the fragility of 
memory as an entity susceptible to distor-
tion and falsehoods.
In addition to the multifarious scientific 
problems of the BEOS test, this technology 
raises important legal-ethical issues of cog-
nitive liberty. Novel issues are cropping 
up due to the use of many emerging tech-
nologies, leading to questions regarding 
a state’s power towards the prosecutorial 
use of information derived from a defen-
dant’s brain activity. Critics of techniques 
such as the BEOS test fear the violation 
of cognitive liberty is a slippery slope 
towards growth in state power and may 
lead to criminalization of thoughts detected 
through advanced neuro-technologies such 
as fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging) or EEG.
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If independent replications and robust 
peer reviews prove the BEOS technology 
reliable, its potential to aid in criminal 
prosecution and defense may be scruti-
nized in light of ethical and legal consid-
erations. By convicting a suspect based on 
the BEOS test, the Pune court has not only 
preemptively deemed the technology reli-
able before a scientific consensus, but also 
brushed aside the ethical-legal questions 
such technologies present. 
Religious Liberty in Uzbekistan 
Continues to suffer
The trial of Aimurat Khayburahmanov 
began on August 15, 2008 with charges 
of participation in a religious extremist 
organization and the unauthorized teaching 
of religion. Uzbekistan’s strict penal code 
criminalizes religious teaching without 
prior approval from the state. The charge 
of religious extremism is considered to be 
unfounded, however, because it is regu-
larly attributed to entities that the Uzbek 
state deems a threat, such as radical Mus-
lim organizations.
As a Protestant, Khayburahmanov 
belongs to a small minority group within 
Uzbekistan that has had difficulty obtain-
ing governmental approval to practice their 
religion. Religious registration is particu-
larly difficult in the autonomous region of 
Karakalpakstan, where Khayburahmanov’s 
trial took place. The region has not regis-
tered non-Muslim or non-Russian Ortho-
dox groups since 2005. 
Judge Yelena Medetova dropped the 
charges brought under Article 244 Section 
2 of the Uzbek criminal code prohibiting 
participation in religious extremist groups. 
Judge Medetova also granted amnesty 
regarding religious instruction without 
prior governmental approval. Such leni-
ency is rare where political trial verdicts 
are determined by state authorities. The 
reason for the leniency in Khayburah-
manov’s case is unclear.
 Legally registering with governmental 
authorities has proven to be a losing battle 
for many religious minorities. Registration 
requirements include providing a list of at 
least one hundred group members and a 
registration address. If a religious group 
meets the requirements but fails to obtain 
governmental approval, the State may eas-
ily decide to persecute the group given that 
it has already obtained the specific names 
of the group through the legitimate submis-
sion of registration requests. This catch-22 
presents significant challenges to religious 
groups who may forgo registration for fear 
of persecution, thus risking a future crack-
down for illegal religious activity. 
The Uzbek state is generally more 
accepting of mainstream religions such 
as Islam, the majority faith. Neverthe-
less, mosque-goers in Karakalpakstan have 
reported plain clothed security personnel 
surveilling mosques, particularly during 
the holy month of Ramadan. 
The U.S. Department of State Interna-
tional Religious Freedom Report of 2008 
criticizes the severe lack of religious free-
dom within Uzbekistan and maintains the 
designation of Uzbekistan as a “Country of 
Particular Concern” under the International 
Religious Freedom Act.
After the 2005 Andijan massacre, 
where government forces killed hundreds 
of protestors, the Uzbek authorities under 
President Karimov have been especially 
concerned about maintaining control and 
ensuring compliance with all laws. As 
the Uzbek government continues to cir-
cumscribe religious activity within the 
narrow confines of state approval, Uzbeks 
continue to suffer from punitive measures 
designed to enhance state authority by 
curbing religious freedom.
Prominent sri Lankan Human 
Rights Lawyer Attacked
On September 27, 2008, a grenade 
exploded in the home of leading Sri Lankan 
human rights lawyer and anti-corruption 
activist, J.C. Weliamuna. Fortunately, 
Weliamuna and his family were not hurt 
in their heavily guarded area of Colombo. 
Three days after the attack, an unidentified 
person tried to enter the Sri Lankan office 
of Transparency International, (an anti-
corruption international NGO) of which 
Weliamuna is executive director. The man 
asked for a person who had never before 
worked in the office and security prevented 
the man from entering while Weliamuna 
escaped. Weliamuna has since gone into 
hiding.
Weliamuna contends that the attack was 
politically motivated and directly related to 
his professional work. Weliamuna advo-
cated for the Seventeenth Amendment to 
the Sri Lankan constitution, which estab-
lishes independent commissions to admin-
ister the police, judiciary, and elections 
departments, thereby reducing the execu-
tive’s power. Weliamuna also represents 
controversial cases and some of his clients 
have become embroiled in the controver-
sies. For example, Lalith Jarapakse, one 
of Weliamuna’s clients, allegedly received 
threats and demands to withdraw his com-
plaint regarding police torture. 
After the attack, high-level members of 
the government, including President Mahi-
nda Rajapaksa, met with the Bar Associa-
tion of Sri Lanka to discuss the incident. 
President Rajapaksa urged an expedited 
investigation and sought to dispel allega-
tions that the government played a role 
in the attack. Over 300 lawyers displayed 
solidarity with Weliamuna in a demonstra-
tion demanding an effective investigation 
and prosecution of the perpetrators.
Numerous organizations have con-
demned the attack, including the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists. They 
describe the context of the attack as one 
in which violence against dissidents is 
rising. For instance, Sugath Nishanta Fer-
nando, a plaintiff in a torture and bribery 
case against the police, was assassinated 
on September 20, 2008 and his lawyers 
received threats demanding a withdrawal 
of the case.
Transparency International identified the 
UN Convention against Corruption, which 
Sri Lanka has ratified, as an international 
legal instrument obliging the govern ment 
to investigate the attack against Welia-
muna. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether 
the government will rigorously investigate 
the attack. In March 2008, an independent 
advisory group, titled The International 
Independent Group of Eminent Persons 
(IIGEP), ceased its work advising the gov-
ernment’s investigative branch on robust 
investigations of human rights violations. 
The IIGEP stopped its work as a result of 
the government’s  obdurateness in adopting 
the group’s recommended reforms.
Although it is uncertain who planned 
and executed the attack upon Weliamuna, 
the incident may be indirectly linked to the 
government’s long and bloody battle with 
the insurgent group, the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The government 
has been harsh with those critical of its 
conduct against the LTTE, as evidenced 
by its prosecution of J.S. Tissainayagam. 
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 Tissainayagam was a journalist whose 
critical reporting led to charges of “bring-
ing the government into disrepute” under 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The Sri 
Lankan government is concerned, not only 
about its image, but also about its legiti-
macy in fighting the insurgency. Whether 
the perpetrators of the Weliamuna attack 
were the state security forces, nationalist 
criminal gangs or other groups, one inten-
tion may be to intimidate voices that osten-
sibly threaten governmental legitimacy and 
consequently, the war against the LTTE. 
eaSt and South eaSt aSia and 
the paciFic
China Avoids United nations Action 
Against Child soldiers in Burma
China, backed by Russia and Indonesia, 
thwarted United Nations Security Council 
efforts to ban recruitment of child soldiers 
in Burma. China prevented the Security 
Council from addressing the issue by bar-
ring UN officials’ access to Burma and 
by suppressing plans to address the issue 
before they could commence.
Burma has a long history of human 
rights abuses, with its military regime 
described as one of the most brutal and 
oppressive regimes in the world. The 
Burmese people are subjected to forced 
labor and face prohibitions on freedom of 
speech, movement, and association. One 
of the most pressing matters, however, is 
the commonplace practice of kidnapping 
and recruiting children as young as 11 into 
the national military. Human Rights Watch 
estimates that about 70,000 of Burma’s 
350,000 soldiers are children.
The United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC) in 1989 which outlined 
the civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights of children. Articles 1 and 
2 of the Optional Protocol on the Involve-
ment of Children in Armed Conflict fur-
ther require signatories to ensure children 
under the age of 18 are not compulso-
rily recruited nor engaged in hostilities. 
Although Burma’s active recruitment and 
use of child soldiers clearly violates the 
CRC and its Optional Protocol and despite 
the fact that the conscription of children 
under the age of 18 is recognized as a war 
crime by the International Criminal Court, 
Burma has escaped relatively unscathed. 
China, a strong supporter of the military 
junta in Burma, has used its position on the 
Security Council to obstruct any discussion 
or action by the UN against the Burmese 
regime.
This is not to say that the Security 
Council has been helpless in the matter 
of child soldiers elsewhere. In 2003, the 
Security Council successfully pushed the 
governments of the Ivory Coast and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo to aban-
don the use of child soldiers and prosecute 
those who were responsible. They also 
took a tough approach in 2007 with respect 
to the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers, whose 
child soldier recruitment dropped over 70 
percent within a six-month deadline. 
The Security Council has repeatedly 
pressured Burma to address its use of child 
soldiers but found little success. China has 
used its political influence to effectively 
block proposals for more comprehensive 
action and has even on occasion prevented 
UN personnel from traveling to Burma to 
verify its claims. 
Article 43 of the CRC establishes the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 
which monitors and carries out the objec-
tives of the Convention. China’s actions 
have effectively rendered the Committee 
useless by barring UN access to Burma. 
China’s position is that in order to build 
a relationship of trust with the Burmese 
state, there must be full acceptance of 
whatever it says. With China’s support, 
Burma continues to use child soldiers, 
evades UN sanctions, and renders the law 
of child soldiers moot. 
new Japanese Government 
sanctions Use of Capital 
Punishment
Newly appointed Japanese Prime Min-
ister Taro Aso, and Minister of Justice Oki-
haru Yasuoka have continued to sanction 
the use of capital punishment, executing 
three men in September 2008. As one of 
only two industrialized democracies still 
practicing capital punishment, Japan has 
been highly criticized for continuing a 
practice that various international organi-
zations have deemed cruel, unusual, and 
torturous. 
The recent executions bring the total 
number to 13 people in 2008. While the 
Japanese public widely supports the state 
taking of life, many within the interna-
tional community have called for Minister 
Yasuoka to reconsider the national policy. 
Non-governmental organizations such as 
Amnesty International have asked Japan 
to comply with United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 62/149, which calls 
for a universal moratorium on the utiliza-
tion of the death penalty. 
In 2006, the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (HRC) found Japan’s Penal 
Code inconsistent with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) due to its secretive, lengthy, and 
inhumane nature. Death row inmates are 
said to be notified of their impending exe-
cution only hours before it occurs, while 
family members are only notified after its 
completion. Failure to give prior notice of 
execution directly violates Articles 2, 7, 
and 10 of the ICCPR, to which Japan is a 
signatory party.
According to Article 475 of the Japa-
nese Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
Minister of Justice has six months to issue 
a death warrant. However, prisoners in the 
past have sat on death row for as long as 
30 years. Further, the appeals process for 
inmates is cumbersome and futile. Those 
convicted at trial based on confessions 
suspected of being given under duress have 
little to no avenue by which to appeal their 
convictions. Between 1983 and 1990, five 
inmates were found falsely convicted and 
released on average 30 years after their 
initial conviction and sentencing. Former 
Minister of Justice Hideo Usui acknowl-
edged that “[t]here are probably more 
cases like that” on death row.
The HRC has previously described 
Japan’s capital punishment system as tor-
turous and inhumane. Death row inmates’ 
lives are characterized by the vacillation 
of their execution and are deprived of 
basic human contact. Executions occur at 
one of seven detention centers throughout 
Japan, where prisoners are blindfolded 
and secured to a noose. An official then 
presses a button which releases a trap door, 
sending prisoners ten feet to their deaths. 
While Japanese officials describe this as 
a clean death, Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch decry it as cruel and 
inhumane.
The Japanese government defends this 
practice with polls showing strong public 
support for the death penalty. Organiza-
tions such as the Japanese Federation of 
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Bar Associations and the Human Rights 
Committee have argued that this is because 
the procedure is largely masked in secrecy. 
The appointment of Prime Minister Aso 
and the recent execution of the three pris-
oners have, however, opened dialogue 
within the Japanese legislature, calling for 
a moratorium and a public debate on the 
issue, as well as better disclosure on all 
issues related to the death penalty.
north Korean Migrant Workers 
May Find More Rights in Mongolia
After about half a century of stringent 
isolationist policy, North Korea entered 
into bilateral agreements with Mongolia 
which may set a positive precedent for 
North Korean migrant workers. The two 
states formally agreed to a program in 
July 2008 whereby North Koreans will be 
able to travel and obtain employment in 
Mongolian factories and firms. The agree-
ment is scheduled to allow approximately 
5,300 North Korean employees to enter 
Mongolia over the next five years. Many 
expect this agreement to foster better labor 
conditions and more comprehensive labor 
laws for North Koreans both domestically 
and abroad. 
North Korea remains one of the last 
centrally planned economies in the world. 
Pyongyang’s almost complete control over 
a rigid, centrally planned economy has led 
to severe downsizing and created wide-
spread unemployment. Small businesses 
are unable to compete against government-
owned industries and the agriculture sector 
has never fully recovered from the Korean 
War and the famine of the 1990’s. 
Work shortages have led North Kore-
ans to search for more favorable conditions 
outside the nation. The Kaesong Industrial 
Complex (KIC), located on the border 
between North and South Korea, consists 
of a number of South Korean firms which 
employ North Koreans in a factory set-
ting producing goods predominantly for 
the South Korean market. North Koreans 
expect to find the same conditions in 
Mongolia. Mongolia will open its main 
industries to the North Koreans, including 
construction, mining, processing of animal 
products, and textile manufacturing. Fur-
thermore, Mongolia’s labor law is more 
liberal in its support of freedom of associa-
tion, minimum wage, and maximum hour 
laws. 
North Korean labor law is notorious for 
its shortcomings in the areas of freedom of 
association, collective bargaining, prohibi-
tions on gender discrimination and sexual 
harassment, child labor, forced labor, max-
imum hours, and minimum wage. Despite 
having found work abroad, North Korean 
workers overseas still face severe restric-
tions upon their freedom of expression, 
movement, and association. North Korean 
“minders” allegedly spy on those who 
work abroad, limiting their movement and 
socialization with others. Those working 
abroad are also consistently required to 
deposit large percentages of their salaries 
into a bank account overseen by North 
Korean embassy officials.
North Koreans employed domestically 
at the KIC are not protected by its labor 
laws and instead are subjected to oppres-
sive and harsh labor conditions. While the 
KIC labor law specifies that employees 
be paid directly in cash, North Koreans’ 
wages are instead paid in U.S. dollars 
directly to the government, which retains 
30 percent for a social welfare fund and 
then redistributes the rest in the North 
Korean Won. 
The employment agreement between 
North Korea and Mongolia is viewed 
internationally as a potentially positive 
step for North Korean migrant work-
ers. Many see this as an opportunity for 
improvement in the field of labor law 
and ask the Mongolian government to 
ensure the North Korean migrant workers 
receive the same benefits and rights their 
own citizens enjoy. Among these rights 
are net wages compliant with minimum 
wage, safe and clean working conditions, 
the ability to assemble, and freedom of 
movement without supervision of North 
Korean officials. HRB
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